Citation Nr: 0733348 Decision Date: 10/24/07 Archive Date: 11/02/07 DOCKET NO. 05-00 552 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Louis, Missouri THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss. 2. Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus. 3. Entitlement to service connection for jungle rot. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD J. Connolly Jevtich, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from January 1965 to January 1968. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a July 2004 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in St. Louis, Missouri. The Board notes that the veteran has submitted additional evidence without initial RO review of this evidence; however, it does not pertain to the issues on appeal. Accordingly, there is no prejudice to the veteran and the Board will proceed on the merits as to the issues on appeal. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Bilateral hearing loss was not manifest during service, within one year of separation, and there is no current diagnosis of bilateral hearing loss which is attributable to service. 2. There is no current diagnosis of tinnitus which is attributable to service. 3. There is no current diagnosis of jungle rot which is attributable to service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Bilateral hearing loss was not incurred in or aggravated by service and may not be presumed to have been incurred therein. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2007). 2. Bilateral tinnitus was not incurred or aggravated in active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2007). 3. Jungle rot was not incurred or aggravated in active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2007). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) With respect to the claimant's claim, VA has met all statutory and regulatory notice and duty to assist provisions. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326. Prior to the initial adjudication of the claimant's claim, a letter dated in April 2004 fully satisfied the duty to notify provisions. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183, 187 (2002). The claimant was aware that it was ultimately the claimant's responsibility to give VA any evidence pertaining to the claim. The VCAA letter told the claimant to provide any relevant evidence in the claimant's possession. See Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 120-21 (2004) (Pelegrini II). ). In particular, the VCAA notification: (1) informed the claimant about the information and evidence not of record that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) informed the claimant about the information and evidence that VA will seek to provide; (3) informed the claimant about the information and evidence that the claimant is expected to provide; and (4) requested that the claimant provide any evidence in his possession that pertains to the claims, or something to the effect that the claimant should "give us everything you've got pertaining to your claim." See Pelegrini II. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) recently held that a statement of the case (SOC) or supplemental statement of the case (SSOC) can constitute a "readjudication decision" that complies with all applicable due process and notification requirements if adequate VCAA notice is provided prior to the SOC or SSOC. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, No. 2007-7130 (Fed. Cir. Sept 17, 2007) (Mayfield III). As a matter of law, the provision of adequate VCAA notice prior to a readjudication "cures" any timing problem associated with inadequate notice or the lack of notice prior to an initial adjudication. See Mayfield III, (citing Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d at 1328, 1333- 34). In any event, the Board finds that any deficiency in the notice to the claimant or the timing of these notices is harmless error. See Overton v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 427, 435 (2006) (finding that the Board erred by relying on various post-decisional documents to conclude that adequate 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) notice had been provided to the claimant, the Court found that the evidence established that the claimant was afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate in the adjudication of the claim, and found that the error was harmless, as the Board has done in this case.) If any notice deficiency is present, the Board finds that the presumption of prejudice on VA's part has been rebutted in this case by the following: (1) based on the communications sent to the veteran over the course of this appeal, the claimant clearly has actual knowledge of the evidence he is required to submit in this case; and (2) based on the claimant's contentions as well as the communications provided to the claimant by VA, it is reasonable to expect that the claimant understands what was needed to prevail. See also Simmons v. Nicholson, 487 F. 3d 892 (2007); see also Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F. 3d 881 (2007). VA also fulfilled its duty to obtain all relevant evidence with respect to the issue on appeal. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. The claimant's service medical records, VA medical treatment records, and identified private medical records have been obtained, to the extent available. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. There is no indication in the record that any additional evidence, relevant to the issue decided herein, is available and not part of the claims file. The records satisfy 38 C.F.R. § 3.326. The veteran has not been examined by VA, but the Board finds that a VA examination is not warranted in this case, as discussed in detail below. Since the Board has concluded that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim of service connection, any questions as to the appropriate disability rating or effective date to be assigned are rendered moot, and no further notice is needed. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Service Connection Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304. Hearing loss disability is defined by regulation. For the purposes of applying the laws administered by VA, impaired hearing will be considered to be a disability when the auditory threshold in any of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 Hertz is 40 decibels or greater; or when the auditory thresholds for at least three of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, or 4000 Hertz are 26 decibels or greater; or when speech recognition scores using the Maryland CNC Test are less than 94 percent. 38 C.F.R. § 3.385. Since November 1, 1967, audiometric results have been reported in standards set forth by the International Standards Organization (ISO)-American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Service department audiometric charts dated after November 1, 1967 are presumed to be in ISO-ANSI units unless otherwise specified, while such charts in VA medical records dated after June 30, 1966, are similarly presumed to be in ISO-ANSI units. In this case, the service department records dated prior to November 1, 1967 have been converted and those dated after November 1967 are presumed to be in ISO-ANSI units. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has held that "the threshold for normal hearing is from 0 to 20 dB [decibels], and higher threshold levels indicate some degree of hearing loss." See Hensley v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 155, 157 (1993). In addition, organic disease of the nervous system such as sensorineural hearing loss will be presumed to have been incurred in or aggravated by service if it had become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year of the veteran's separation from service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. This presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Further, VA regulation provides that, with chronic disease shown as such in service (or within an applicable presumptive period under section 3.307) so as to permit a finding of service connection, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are service connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. For the showing of chronic disease in service there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time, as distinguished from merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the word "chronic." When the disease identity is established (leprosy, tuberculosis, multiple sclerosis, etc.), there is no requirement of an evidentiary showing of continuity. Continuity of symptomatology is required only where the condition noted during service (or in the presumptive period) is not, in fact, shown to be chronic or where the diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned. When the fact of chronicity in service is not adequately supported, then a showing of continuity after discharge is required to support the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). In addition, service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). A claim for service connection generally requires competent evidence of a current disability; proof as to incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury in service, as provided by either lay or medical evidence, as the situation dictates; and competent evidence as to a nexus between the inservice injury or disease and the current disability. Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 137 (1997); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994). A claim for service connection generally requires competent evidence of a current disability; proof as to incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury in service, as provided by either lay or medical evidence, as the situation dictates; and competent evidence as to a nexus between the inservice injury or disease and the current disability. Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 137 (1997); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994). The Court has consistently held that, under the law cited above, "[a] determination of service connection requires a finding of the existence of a current disability and a determination of a relationship between that disability and an injury or disease incurred in service." Watson v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 309, 314 (1993). This principle has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Federal Circuit, which has stated, "a veteran seeking disability benefits must establish . . . the existence of a disability [and] a connection between the veteran's service and the disability." Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The existence of a current disability is the cornerstone of a claim for VA disability compensation. See Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F. 3d 1328 (1997) (holding that the VA's and the Court's interpretation of sections 1110 and 1131 of the statute as requiring the existence of a present disability for VA compensation purposes cannot be considered arbitrary and therefore the decision based on that interpretation must be affirmed); see also Gilpin v. West, 155 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). In the absence of proof of a present disability, there can be no valid claim. Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 141, 143- 44 (1992). In determining whether service connection is warranted for a disability, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the veteran prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which case the claim is denied. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). To do so, the Board must assess the credibility and weight of all the evidence, including the medical evidence, to determine its probative value, accounting for evidence that it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and providing reasons for rejecting any evidence favorable to the appellant. See Masors v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 181 (1992). The service medical records reveal that the veteran was seen in September 1966 for an infected foot and was noted to have severe cellulitis. Several small pustules were lanced and cultured. The veteran was given Penicillin. Within three days, the veteran was noted to be doing better. No further treatment or diagnosis was made. The service medical records further reveal that the veteran had no complaints, findings, treatment, or diagnosis of hearing loss or tinnitus during service. The veteran did, however, make other medical complaints. The absence of evidence constitutes negative evidence tending to disprove the claim that the veteran suffered from hearing loss, tinnitus, or jungle rot, in service which resulted in chronic disability or persistent symptoms thereafter. See Forshey v. West, 12 Vet. App. 71, 74 (1998), aff'd sub nom. Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that the definition of evidence encompasses "negative evidence" which tends to disprove the existence of an alleged fact). With regard to inservice audiological evaluations, on the entrance examination in January 1965, on the audiological evaluation, puretone thresholds, in decibels, were as follows: HERTZ 500 1000 2000 3000 4000 RIGHT 0(15) 0(10) 0(10) N/A 0(5) LEFT 0(15) 0(15) 0(10) N/A 0(5) On the January 1968 separation examination, the ears, feet, and skin were normal. On the audiological examination, puretone thresholds, in decibels, were as follows: HERTZ 500 1000 2000 3000 4000 RIGHT 15 0 5 N/A 0 LEFT 15 0 15 N/A 5 Hearing was shown to be within normal limits during service. See Hensley. Post-service, there are no pertinent records concerning hearing loss within the first post-service year. With regard to claimed bilateral hearing loss and bilateral tinnitus, there are no post-service findings, treatment or diagnosis. Although the veteran's representative asserts that a VA examination should be conducted, the Board finds that a VA examination is not warranted. Pursuant to VA's duty to assist, VA will provide a medical examination or obtain a medical opinion based upon a review of the evidence of record if VA determines it is necessary to decide the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4)(i). A medical examination or medical opinion may be deemed necessary where the record contains competent medical evidence of a current diagnosed disability, establishes that the veteran suffered an event, injury or disease in service, and indicates that the claimed disability may be associated with the established event, injury or disease in service. See Id. The record before VA need only (1) contain competent evidence that the veteran has persistent or recurrent symptoms of current disability and (2) indicate that those symptoms may be associated with the veteran's active military service. Duenas v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 512 (2004). In McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006), the Court noted that the third prong of 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4)(I), requires that the evidence of record "indicate" that the claimed disability or symptoms may be associated with service, establishes a low threshold. See also Locklear v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 410, at 418 (2006). In this case, the low threshold is not met. The service medical records are negative. The veteran was a wheeled vehicle mechanic during service. There is no record of any acoustic trauma, although this is asserted. The veteran was never put on any hearing profile, he did not report any hearing problems, and his hearing was within normal limits throughout service. There were no complaints, findings, treatment, or diagnosis since service separation in 1968. The VA records dated from 2001 onward are also negative. Accordingly, there is no indication that any current complaints of bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus are etiologically related to service to include to event, injury or disease in service. Thus, there is no current diagnosis of either bilateral hearing loss or bilateral tinnitus. With regard to claimed jungle rot, the service medical records are also negative. Although the veteran was treated for an infected foot and cellulitis, the feet and skin were normal at separation. There were no complaints on separation examination. There was no inservice diagnosis of jungle rot. Following service, there is no post-service diagnosis. An October 2001 evaluation noted that the veteran reported that he had jungle rot during service and that his feet were black. Currently, he had minor cracks between his toes with dead skin. There was no reported etiological relationship indicated between current complaints to service nor was the veteran diagnosed as having jungle rot or the residuals thereof. The Board finds that since the service medical records are negative, the post-service record is negative for jungle rot, and the October 2001 evaluation did not attribute the skin abnormalities to service to include jungle rot during service, further VA examination is not warranted. The veteran contends that bilateral hearing loss, bilateral tinnitus, and jungle rot, are related to service. The veteran can attest to factual matters of which he had first- hand knowledge, e.g., experiencing pain in service, reporting to sick call, being placed on limited duty, and undergoing physical therapy. See Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362, 368 (2005). However, the veteran as a lay person has not been shown to be capable of making medical conclusions, thus, his statements regarding causation are not competent. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 495 (1992). Thus, while the veteran is competent to report what comes to him through his senses, he does not have medical expertise. See Layno. Therefore, he cannot provide a competent opinion regarding diagnosis and causation. However, the Federal Circuit has held that lay evidence is one type of evidence that must be considered and competent lay evidence can be sufficient in and of itself. The Board, however, retains the discretion to make credibility determinations and otherwise weigh the evidence submitted, including lay evidence. See Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006). This would include weighing the absence of contemporary medical evidence against lay statements. In Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet App 303 (2007), the Court indicated that varicose veins was a condition involving "veins that are unnaturally distended or abnormally swollen and tortuous." Such symptomatology, the Court concluded, was observable and identifiable by lay people. Because varicose veins "may be diagnosed by their unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of varicose veins was not a determination 'medical in nature' and was capable of lay observation." Thus, the veteran's lay testimony regarding varicose vein symptomatology in service represented competent evidence. In Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F. 3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the Federal Circuit determined that lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition (noting that sometimes the layperson will be competent to identify the condition where the condition is simple, for example a broken leg, and sometimes not, for example, a form of cancer), (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. The relevance of lay evidence is not limited to the third situation, but extends to the first two as well. Whether lay evidence is competent and sufficient in a particular case is a fact issue. Once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether such evidence is also credible. See Layno, supra (distinguishing between competency ("a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered") and credibility ("a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted")). See Barr. The veteran is competent to state that he had inservice hearing problems and ringing in his ears. He is also competent to state that his feet had skin problems. However, the veteran is not competent to state whether his hearing was within normal limits on audiological evaluation nor is he competent to make etiological medical assessments. Further, he made no complaints of hearing loss or tinnitus during service. Although he was seen for an infected foot and cellulitis, contemporaneous records indicate that these medical problems apparently resolved by separation. There was no inservice diagnosis of jungle rot. As noted, the service medical records were negative for such reports and specifically found that the ears, feet, and skin, were all normal when the veteran was separated. There is no current medical nexus between claimed disabilities and service. There are no current diagnoses. As such, his contentions to the contrary are not credible. Conclusion Service connection is not warranted for bilateral hearing loss on a direct or presumptive basis, for bilateral tinnitus, or for jungle rot. The evidence in this case is not so evenly balanced so as to allow application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule as required by law and VA regulations. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. The preponderance is against the veteran's claims, and they must be denied. ORDER Service connection for bilateral hearing loss is denied. Service connection for bilateral tinnitus is denied. Service connection for jungle rot is denied. ____________________________________________ S. L. Kennedy Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs